Discrimination in State University Housing Programs - Policy and Constitutional Consideration by Van Alstyne, William W.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1960
Discrimination in State University Housing
Programs - Policy and Constitutional
Consideration
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1960 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Van Alstyne, William W., "Discrimination in State University Housing Programs - Policy and Constitutional Consideration" (1960).
Faculty Publications. Paper 766.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/766
Discrimination in 
State University Housing Programs-
Policy and Constitutional Consideration 
WILLIAM w. VAN ALsTYNE'::: 
In nearly all major state universities today, substantial numbers 
of students are obliged to live off-campus in private apartments or 
rooming houses.1 Rather than cast these students into unfamiliar 
neighborhoods to find suitable accommodations by chance, most of 
these universities maintain some facility which refers students to 
landlords who have registered with the university. Typically, the 
privilege of registering is limited to those landlords who comply 
with university standards of health, safety, and supervision with 
respect to such things as visiting hours and alcohol control. Not-
withstanding the availability of such services, however, racial and 
religious barriers cause certain groups of students to experience 
unusual difficulty in locating adequate housing.2 
The existence of racial discrimination in registered, off-campus 
housing raises several issues of policy and law. With respect to 
policy, there is evidently some difference of opinion as to a uni-
versity's responsibility to provide its student body ·with a non-
segregated environment, particularly with respect to off-campus, 
privately owned housing. A representative survey of state univer-
sities outside the Deep South indicates that seventeen of forty-three 
universities have resolved that a willingness to accept all qualified 
students, regardless of race or color, is a reasonable condition to 
require of landlords registered with those universities.3 There may 
"Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. B.A., 
University of Southern California, 1955; LL.B., Stanford University, 1958. 
1. See Appendix at p. 78, infra, for a survey of state universities which maintain off-
campus housing facilities. Southern universities were not canvassed because the great ma-
jority continue to be segregated, thus raising no problem in the off-campus housing of 
Negro students. Private universities were not surveyed since their housing practices do not 
raise the same constitutional issues, although some of these universities do enforce non-
discrimination policies against registered landlords, e.g., Harvard, Yale, and Radcliffe. See 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1959, p. 83, col. 3; New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination 
memorandum of May 8, 1959, p. 1, Cornell University Adopts Non-Discrimination Policy 
for Off-Campus Housing. 
2. For example, of 447 landlords registered with Ohio State University in November 
1959, only 57 (or 13%) responded to a University questionnaire by indicating their willing-
ness to accommodate students without regard to race or color. Ohio State Lantern, Feb. 24, 
1960, p. 3. See AppendLx at p. 78, infra. 
3. See Appendix at p. 78, infra. 
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be some modest question whether enforcement of such a condition 
through a threat to delist discriminatory landlords unconstitution~ 
ally deprives them of property without due process, though the 
answer now appears to be quite clear. With respect to other uni~ 
versities which maintain substantial connections with discrimi~ 
natory landlords and which do not enforce any policy against such 
discrimination, however, a more serious question exists as to 
whether these universities may unwittingly be violating the four~ 
teenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection. The purpose 
of this article is to review briefly the choice of values implicit in 
the policies of each group of universities, and to discuss the con~ 
stitutionality of those policies.4 
Policy Considerationi 
Whether the constitutional vehicle has been the due process 
clause,6 or the equal protection clause/ objections by landlords to 
state action restricting their capacity to discriminate because of race 
are fundamentally bound up with an alleged "right" or "preroga~ 
tive" of nonassociation.8 Out of context, the assertion of such a 
4. For an earlier article, written before Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 38 
A.L.R. 2d 1180 (1954), briefly examining a related problem of discrimination by fraterni-
ties "recognized" by state universities, see Horowitz, Discriminatory Fraternities at State 
Universities-A Violaton of tlze Fourteenth Amendment, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 289 (1952). 
5. This attempt to restate the normative principles involved in the "right" of non-
association versus the "right" of equal access, is a self-conscious response to Samuel John-
son's reflections on the law: "SIR ALE..'CANDER: 'The bar is not so abusive as it was for-
merly. I fancy they had less law long ago, and were obliged to take to abuse to fill up the 
time. Now they have such a number of precedents, they have no occasion for abuse.' 
JOHNSON: 'Nay, Sir, they had more law long ago than they have now. As to precedents, 
to be sure they will increase in the course of time. Btl! the more precedents there are, the 
less occasion is there for law; that is to say, the less occasion is there for investigating prin• 
ciples. Is it not so, Bozzy?' BOSWELL: 'Certainly, Sir.' " BoSWELL FOR nm DEFENSE 
1769-1774, at 70 (Wamsatt & Pottle eds. 1959). (Emphasis added.} 
6. See, e.g., New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., 
Inc., 10 Misc.2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Compare Pyeatte v. Board of 
Regents, 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla. 1951), af]'d, 342 U.S. 936 (1952). 
7. See New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc., 
10 Misc.2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Compare O'Meara v. Washington State 
Bd. Against Discrimination, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 664 (No. 535996) (Sup. Ct. Wash. July 
13, 1959) (criticized in Forster & Rabkin, The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimi-
nation in Publicly Assigned Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38, 48-57 (1960)), and 28 0Ps. ORE. 
ATT'Y GEN. 86 (1957), reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 746 (1957), with Levitt & Sons v. 
Division Against Discrimination, 56 N.J. Super. 542, 153 A.2d 700 (App. Div. 1959), a[fd, 
31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 80 Sup. Ct. 1257 (1960). 
8. For an intemperate defense of this "prerogative," see Avins, Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom of Choice, 6 N.Y .L.F. 13, 37 (1960): "All the 
fancy phrases of 'democratic living,' 'fair housing,' 'open occupancy,' and 'equality' cannot 
substitute for the denial of the right of freedom of association. Infringement of this right 
makes antidiscrimination legislation in housing violative of fundamental liberties." 
The word "right" is placed in quotations in the text to indicate that we are here con-
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prerogative is not without appeal. Essentially, the interest involved 
in such an assertion rests on a value judgment that a man's selection 
of associates, either as friends, business associates, or tenants, ought 
not be hedged about with state imposed notions of right and 
wrong which, in the last analysis, enjoy no divine guarantee of 
excellence or superiority. For a state institution to compel a land-
lord to lease part of what he owns to those whom he considers un-
desirable may be viewed as infringing on his freedom of choice 
and abridging the significance of ownership. 
A property owner's interest in nonassociation does not exist in 
a vacuum, however; the uncontrolled exercise of such an interest 
may trample under foot competing interests of even higher value. 
Balanced against the pristine interest of property owners in declin-
ing to deal even on arbitrary bases and to make irrelevant differ-
ences of color the grounds for distinguishing among men, is the 
interest of the adversely affected class to pursue its opportunities in 
society free of artificial barriers not thrown up against others. In 
the case at hand, it is the interest of Negroes in equal access to 
facilities which are open to others. A juxtaposition of this claim 
of equal opportunity for housing with the claim of nonassociation 
indicates that both cannot be completely satisfied in all situations. 
In the context of university housing programs, the better case 
clearly lies with those asserting an interest in equal access. It may 
be (though not persuasively, I think) argued that discrimination 
against Negroes with respect to casual interests, such as equal access 
to malt shops and country clubs, ought not be placed above the 
proprietors' or the club members' interest in nonassociation even 
though the exclusion arbitrarily stigmatizes those who are rejected.9 
cerned not with a legally enforceable claim, but rather with a philosophic claim or value 
judgment that there is some legitimacy in the interest of each person to determine his 
associations, regardless of his reasons. 
9. Note, however, that the Supreme Court has held that segregation even in state 
operated facilities of recreation, amusement, and transportation is unconstitutional. Com-
pare Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 38 
A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and Briggs v. Elliott, 132 
F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (all dealing with "fundamental" interests in educa-
tion), with Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), 
Dawson v. Mayor & City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), a[fd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); 
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Ala.), a[J'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (overruling 
sub silentio Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)), and Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 
102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951), affd sub nom. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 
202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated, 347 U.S. 971, 38 A.L.R.2d 1190 (1954). See also 
Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 128 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.S.C.), retld, 224 F.2d 
752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956). 
Since the Brown Court stressed the harmful effects of segregation only in education, 
Brown v. Board of Educ., supra at 494, and since it expressly limited its holding to segre-
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It can scarcely be doubted, however, that when discrimination is 
practiced in housing, and against students still in their formative 
years/0 the effect is more certainly an abridgment of a fundamental 
interest in democratic education, by forcing them into ghetto-like 
living which prejudices their whole existence-an interest clearly 
more critical than the landlord's desire for unrestricted use of the 
housing lists.11 
Also relevant as a matter of policy in balancing these competing 
interests is the amount of discrimination involved. It may be ar-
gued that if but a few landlords exclude Negroes, the latter's inter-
est in equal access has been only slighdy disturbed; presumably, 
they still enjoy access to many other nonsegregated houses of at 
least equal physical accommodation. But when the capacity to 
discriminate (euphemistically disguised as a "prerogative of non-
association") is exercised so extensively that the minority's hope 
of securing desired goals is cut off, the principle of equal oppor-
tunity has in fact given way to a cruel and inexplicable tyranny of 
the many, clearly not justifiable under the rubric of "ownership" 
or any other such notion.12 Parenthetically, it may be noted that 
gation "in the field of public education • • • ." Id. at 495, extension of Brown into re· 
lated areas by per curiam opinions has properly been the subject of criticism. See Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 22, 31-35 (1959); 
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1959); Note, The Supreme Court-1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. REv. 
85, 150-51 (1957). 
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954), 
where the segregation of the young was said to generate "a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone." 
11. See, e.g., 1959 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS CoMM'N REPORT, 386-93. But see GLAZER & 
McENTIRE, STUDIES IN HousiNG AND MINoRITY GRoUPs 9 (1960). 
12. Increasingly, it has been recognized that the enormous power traditionally asso-
ciated with government has passed into private hands, see, e.g., BERLE, THE 20TH CEN· 
TORY CAPITALIST REvoLUTION (1954); BERLE, EcoNoMIC PoWER AND THE FREE SociETY 
(1957); Miller, The Constitutional Law of the 'Security State,' 10 STAN. L. REv. 620, 634-
38 (1958), reviving the argument that the fourteenth amendment must be construed to 
prohibit substantial abuses of power whether e.xercised by the "state" politic or the "state" 
economic. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
Still another approach towards eradicating racial discrimination in an area of funda-
mental concern where prejudice by a majority seriously affects basic interests, is suggested 
in BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 266 (1957). 
"A change in the meaning of state action ean also be accomplished by reintroducing 
into this area of constitutional thinking some basic common law principles. Some future 
Supreme Court might well hold that any activity which affects large numbers of the general 
public automatically becomes a matter of governmental concern, and thus falls within the 
state action concept. Under such an analysis the services of hotels, restaurants and theaters 
would have to be made available to the general public without regard to race. [Compare 
the dissent of Justice Harlan in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).] This was the old 
English common law rule governing inns and common carriers, since those facilities are 
inherendy public in character. And while housing was not of public concern at common 
law, present-day, large-scale housing developments could be declared a matter of govern-
ment interest within the conte.xt of the Fourteenth Amendment. This approach would 
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the "prerogative of nonassociation" as a personal interest often is 
not genuinely involved in university off-campus housing, since 
rental units may be owned by absentee landlords, rather than by 
families renting but a single room in their own homes. In reconcil-
ing these considerations of policy, and in relating them to the police 
power of the state, it would appear that the state could reasonably 
determine that the effect of discrimination in this situation13 is 
more harmful to some than the effect of nondiscrimination on 
others who oppose it. The philosophy of the fourteenth amend-
mene4 suggests the persuasive policy argument to be made for a 
state institution's withholding support from discriminatory land-
lords. Indeed, since housing discrimination is unlikely to end 
through voluntary means/6 the argument in favor of positive state 
action becomes most compelling. 
That State Universities May Enforce a Policy of Nondiscrimination 
in Registered Housing 
While the Supreme Court has not passed direcdy upon the 
power of a state to compel nondiscrimination in "private" housing 
by penal sanctions, two states are sufficiendy confident of the con-
stitutionality of such legislation that they have placed it on their 
statute books.16 Additionally, the highest courts of two states have 
upheld the constitutionality of the application of antidiscrimina-
tion legislation to private housing where the financing was insured 
preclude racial discrimination in these private activities regardless of any specific action on 
the part of the state and regardless of whether the state had ever undertaken such activities 
in the past." Id. at 266-67. 
See Frank and Mumo, The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Latus', 
50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131, 167-68 (1950). 
13. The need for exacting inquiry into the factual and policy consequences implicit in 
constitutional decisions which necessarily prefer one value over another in a given context 
is persuasively presented in Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, I Su-
PRE:ME CoURT REVIEW {to be published). 
14. In a case upholding the right of a state to withhold facilities from racially dis-
criminatory labor unions, the Supreme Court approved the state's policy in the following 
terms: "[A] State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of 
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's hurt. 
To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such state power would stultify that 
Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race, 
color or creed, in relations like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitu-
tional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination 
beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts." Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 
88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). See Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 
U.S. 28 (1948); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Betts v. Easley, 161 
Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831, 166 A.L.R. 342 (1946). 
15. For a brief review of evasive schemes privately employed to preserve segregated 
housing, see Note, Pttblicly-Owned Facilities, Housing, and Transportation: Federally Guar-
anteed Civil Rights, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 377, 384-88 (1959). 
16. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53-35 (1959); MICH. Col\!P. LAws § 750.146. 
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by the federal government.17 In the more recent decision, the 
United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for want of a 
substantial federal question.18 
Against this background, the case of a university housing 
officer's power merely to withhold special services from discrimi~ 
natory landlords is indeed an easy one; by instituting such a policy, 
the university does not affirmatively require any landlord to sur~ 
render his prejudices or to abrogate his prerogatives. Rather, it 
limits the privilege of sharing a captive market of students and 
enjoying the free services of university advertising and referral 
personnel to those landlords who are willing to treat all qualified 
students with equal respect and accommodation. The right of 
the university to impose such a condition is probably greater than 
the power of the state~at-large, because of its pronounced respon~ 
sibility for the welfare of its student body.19 A university's respon~ 
sibility to provide a nonsegregated atmosphere for its students has 
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court to extend beyond the 
walls of the classroom.20 Indeed, the right of a state university to 
ban fraternities affiliated with national organizations in an effort 
to stop racial discrimination, has been upheld in the federal courts.21 
And, finally, it is not without significance that none of the state 
universities which presendy maintain nondiscriminatory policies 
in off~ampus housing have been challenged in court.22 
17. New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc., 10 
Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Levitt & Sons v. Division Against Dis-
crimination, 56 N.J.Super. 542, 153 A.2d 700 (App. Div. 1959), a{fd, 31 N.J. 514, 158 
A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 80 Sup. Ct. 1257 (1960). For recent discussions of such legis-
lation, see GREENBERG, R\CE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw 304-12 (1959); Forster & 
Rabkin, The Constit11tionality of Laws Against Discrimination in P11blicly Assisted HotiS-
ing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38 (1960). See also Note, Tht: New jersey Ho11sing Anti-Bias Law: Appli-
cability to Non-State Aided Developments, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 557 (1958); 56 MICH. L. 
REv. 1223 (1958). Compare Witherwa.x, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as It Affects Real 
Property Rights, 23 ALBANY L. REv. 75 (1959). 
18. Levitt & Sons v. Division Against Discrimination, 80 Sup. Ct. 1257 (1960). 
19. See Pyeatte v. Board of Regents, 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla. 1951), affd, 342 
U.S. 936 (1952). See also Hamilton v. Board of Regents of University of California, 293 
U.S. 245 (1934); Waugh v. Board of Trustees of University of Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589, 596 
(1915); Webb v. State University, 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismisst:d, 348 
U.S. 867 (1954); Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), 
aff'd, 323 U.S. 685 (1945). 
20. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). See Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
21. Webb v. State University of New York, 125 F. Supp. 190 (N.D.N.Y.), appt:al 
dismissed, 348 U.S. 867 (1954). The state's power was upheld even though the national 
organization had no discriminatory policies. Even where a landlord's ability to locate 
lessees has been virtually eliminated by a university regulation restricting students from 
living off campus, the courts have rejected the landlord's arguments based on the due 
process, equal protection, and contract clauses. Pyeatte v. Board of Regents, 102 F. Supp. 
407 (W.D. Okla. 1951), affd, 342 U.S. 936 (1952). 
22. In anticipating how the Supreme Court might react to such a case, it should be 
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That State Universities May Not Operate a Facility Which 
Directs Students Into Segregated Housing 
Operation of state university housing offices must conform to 
the fourteenth amendment which provides: "No State shall ... 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."23 Implicit in any issue arising under the equal protec~ 
tion clause are two lines of inquiry, best examined separately: Is 
the state the author of the conduct with which we are con~ 
cerned ?24 Is the conduct of a kind which involves a denial of 
equal protection ?25 The dichotomy is, of course, self-evident. 
It merits restatement here, only to emphasize that two separate 
classes of possible defendants are involved in university housing 
programs: the universities and the landlords. It will be found that 
the constitutional problems with respect to the former relate almost 
exclusively to the issue of the type of conduct involved, while the 
problems with respect to the latter relate almost exclusively to de~ 
termining whether they are the state for purposes of the four~ 
teenth amendment/6 an issue not covered in this article. Our 
borne in mind that the Court has definitely moved toward an upgrading of the states' 
interests in a nonsegregated educational environment, at the same time it has tended to 
minimize the significance of private property rights. Thus, in Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), the Court remarked: "Today, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments. • • • Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms." Compare these reflections from Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-6 (1946), 
on the adequacy of property ownership as a justification for excluding offensive speech: 
"We do not agree that • • • property interests settle the question. • • • Ownership does 
not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by 
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." 
23. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
24. It is clear that in the absence of state action, the fourteenth amendment will not 
inhibit even the grossest kind of discrimination. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 
(1951); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 
(1920); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); 
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
(1875). State inaction may violate the fourteenth amendment also. See Lynch v. United 
States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 
1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); Cat1ette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 
1943). See generally Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375 (1958). 
25. That this is a separate inquiry, too often confused as part of the "state action" 
inquiry, is made admirably clear in Horowitz, The Misleading Search for 'State Action' 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957). 
26. The cases provoking the most discussion (excepting the Brown case) under the 
equal protection clause, have virtually all concerned action which, if practiced by state 
agencies, would clearly involve unconstitutional conduct. These cases have generally been 
brought against nongovernmental agencies, however, and thus while the Court had given 
a great deal of attention to the "state action" concept, it has done little to illuminate the 
penumbral areas of the "permissible conduct" concept. 'With respect to state action and the 
right to vote see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944); Perry v. Cyphers, 186 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1951); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 
(4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th 
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immediate concern is with the officers of state universities who 
operate the housing offices, and possibly with university trustees 
or regents who promulgate rules governing operation of the hous-
ing offices. As to these, it is well settled that their actions are the 
actions of the state for purposes of the equal protection clause.27 
The significant question is whether the practice of university 
officers connected with an off-campus housing program embracing 
discriminatory housing is conduct of a kind which denies equal 
protection. The answer will depend upon the type of program in-
volved. If the university denies minority students access to houses 
which it owns or leases, and the denial is identified with the stu-
dents' race or color, the conduct is of a proscribed kind; exclusion 
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946); Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 
1948); United States v. Wilson, 72 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Mo. 1947). Regarding state action 
and the right of free speech see, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Tucker v. 
Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). Regarding state action and employment see, e.g., Black v. 
Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Tucker v. Te.xas, supra; Steele v. Louisviiie & 
N.R.R., 323 U.S.192 (1944); Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). Regard-
ing state action and education see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 
353 U.S. 230 (1957); In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. 
denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). 
Regarding state action and housing see, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 249 (1953); 
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 3 A.L.R.2d 441 
(1948). Compare Charlotte Park v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 331, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. 
denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) witlz Smith v. Clark, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 200 (D.C. Colo. 
1956), affd sub nom. Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 
(1957), and Robinson v. Mansfield, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 445 (Super. Ct. Ariz. 1956); 
Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Te.x. Civ. App. 1948). 
For current writings on the "state action" concept, see, e.g., GREENBERG, RAcE RELA-
TIONS AND AMERICAN WW 46-61 (1959); MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRrVATE 
EDUCATION (1957); Abernathy, Expansion of tlze State Action Concept Under tlze Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); Saks & Rabkin, Racial and Religious 
Discrimination in HottSing: A Report of Legal Progress, 45 IowA L. REv. 488 (1960); State 
Action, A Study of Reqttirements Under tlze Fotlrteentlz Amendment, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 
613 (1956). 
One may surmise from the trend of the cases that if a suit were brought against dis-
criminatory landlords who are "registered" with a state university, the Court might find 
sufficient "state action" to provide injunctive relief. See 32 0Ps. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 264 
(1959), reprinted in 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 493 (1959}. Compare Ming v. Horgan, 3 RACE 
REL. L. REP. 693 (Super. Ct. Calif. 1958), witlz Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 
N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) and Johnson v. Levitt 
& Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114, 30 A.L.R.2d 602 (E.D. Pa. 1955). See also Barnes v. City 
of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S •• 915 (1960); Cohen v. 
Public Housing Administration, 257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 
(1959). 
27. The Supreme Court long ago declared that the fourteenth amendment covers not 
only state power embodied in the legislature, but that it e.xtends to all agents of the State, 
regardless of the branch of government they represent. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 
(1879). Included among responsible state agents are university trustees, curators, and re-
gents. "The action of the curators, who are representatives of the State in the management 
of the state university must be regarded as state action." Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
305 U.S. 337 (1938). See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
Even if subordinate state officials act in e.xcess of their authority, or violate state laws 
or the state constitution by their acts, their conduct is still state action within the meaning 
of the fourteenth amendment. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 162 A.L.R. 1330 (1945); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. 
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from or segregation within any state owned28 or leased facility2~ 
for racial reasons has been held consistently to deny equal pro-
tection. 
The more typical situation, however, relates to university re-
ferral policies with respect to registered houses which are privately 
owned. The university's procedure with respect to these houses 
is not conduct which excludes a person from a state facility, for 
the only state facility immediately involved is not the rooming 
house, but rather a university office. And the policy of the uni-
versity is not to exclude from or segregate minority students in the 
use of this office, but only to follow a different procedure in refer-
ring them to off-campus houses than is followed for white students. 
The question becomes, then, whether the difference in the re-
ferral procedure is of a prohibited kind. Taken in conjunction with 
other university rules, it may be prohibited because of the discrimi-
natory effect the total university policy has upon minority students. 
Assume, for instance, that the university has a rule that all under-
graduate students (or more typically, all undergraduate female 
students) must live on campus or in registered rooming houses. 
Assume also that the housing office has been advised by various 
landlords that they will not accept minority students, and in defer-
ence to these landlords the office does not include these houses on 
listings made available to minority students. The net effect of the 
whole operation is that the university has affirmatively compelled 
some students to live only in certain registered houses, a restriction 
based only on race. The practice is obviously conduct of a kind 
which denies equal protection.80 
Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); Horne Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 
(1913). See Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947). 
28. For cases involving government owned housing facilities, see Heyward v. Public 
Housing Authority, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956); Detroit Housing Cornrn'n v. Lev.is, 
226 F.2d ISO {6th Cir. 1955); Askew v. Benton Harbor Housing Cornrn'n, 2 RAcE REI.. 
L. REP. 6Il {W.D. Mich. 1957); Davis v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 1 RAcE REI.. L. 
REP. 353 (E.D. Mo. 1955); Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 {E.D. Mich. 
1954); Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App.2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116 (1954). 
29. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating andre-
manding 202 F.2d 275 {6th Cir. 1953); City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 
(4th Cir. 1957); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 
U.S. 924 (1957); Tate v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 
1955), atfd, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956). 
30. It is an "obvious" violation of the equal protection clause because it e.'l:ceeds 
practices which have been held to be unconstitutional. Thus, where governmental bodies 
have not affirmatively compelled Negroes to live in certain, segregated houses, but have 
merely promulgated rules and ordinances restricting them from leasing or buying certain 
private homes, such legislative exclusion has been invalidated. Harmon v. Tvler. 278 U.S. 
668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 
712 (4th Cir. 1930), atfd, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). 
Curiously, the doctrine of "separate but equal" in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
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Even if the university does not prevent its students from living 
in unregistered houses, a policy of refusing minority students ac-
cess to complete housing lists, where certain houses are withheld 
only for racial reasons, is probably a denial of equal protection as 
well. Such a policy may operate much like a zoning ordinance 
restricting the leasing and purchase of some private property on 
grounds of race or color. Similarly, the university has withheld 
information necessary to locate certain housing accommodations, 
while the information is made available to others not of the same 
race. 
The net effect is to cut off student access to certain houses-a 
state policy exercised only with respect to minority students. 
Ordinances of this type have been held unconstitutional since 
1917,31 and it should make no difference whether the practice stems 
from legislative fiat by a municipal council, or executive fiat by 
a state university office.32 
It might be thought, however, that the purpose of a state uni~ 
versity's reluctance to refer minority students to discriminatory 
landlords should be controlling, and since that purpose may not be 
to injure the minority students, any discriminatory effect is strictly 
incidental and not of a constitutional magnitude. The Court has 
indicated, however, that it is the fact of state participation in a dis-
criminatory scheme which violates the equal protection clause, 
regardless of the purpose for which it is done.33 Thus, it is no de-
(1896), has apparentlr never applied in tile housing field. See Harmon v. Tyler; Buchanan 
v. Warley; Cicy of Richmond v. Deans, supra; Cicy of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 
(5tll Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951); Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing 
Autlloricy, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Bank v. Housing Autlloricy, 120 Cal. 
App.2d 1, 260 P.2d 688, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1953); McGovney, Racial Residential 
Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants, or Condi-
tions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 5 (1945). But see Favors v. Randall, 
40 F. Supp. 743 (D.C. Pa. 1941); Housing Autlloricy v. Higgenbottom, 143 S.W.2d 95 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940). 
31. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). It should not matter that 
many or all of tllese landlords might personally reject Negro students when inimediately 
confronted witll an application to lease, for tile denial of equal protection, as in tile ordi-
nance cases, is tile denial of access to tile landlords. 
32. See note 27 supra. 
33. Thus, it is of no consequence tllat tile university may sanction segregation not from 
any racial aninius of its own, but only to prevent ill-feeling and friction from arising in the 
community: "Desirable as tllis is, [i.e., promoting public peace by averting racial friction] 
and iniportant as is tile preservation of the public peace, tllis aini cannot be accomplished 
by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by tile Federal Constitution." 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917). See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); 
Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4tll Cir.), affd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Kerr 
v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4tll Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). 
\Vitll respect to tile issue of "state action" in tile Kerr case, compare Eaton v. Board of 
Managers, 261 F.2d 521 (4tll Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). Siniilarly, a 
purpose to allay tile fears of landlords tllat referrals to tlleir neighborhood may depreciate 
propercy value is no defense. There are considerable data available, however, indicating tllat 
integration in housing does not depreciate propercy values. See, e.g., EMERSON & HABER, 
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fense for a state institution to claim that it must withhold certain 
listings from minority students to prevent discriminatory landlords 
from withdrawing from the university housing program. If a state 
facility cannot operate "successfully" without discriminating ra-
cially, then it is not constitutionally entitled to operate at all.34 
It might also be thought that use of a housing office is a matter 
of privilege, a special consideration that the university extends as 
a matter of grace, and that since students originally had no legal 
right to insist even upon the existence of such a facility, they can 
hardly complain of being denied any part of its services. But this 
objection is true even with respect to a university education itself-
that the state is under no constitutional obligation to maintain a 
university. Nevertheless where the state has resolved to establish 
such facilities, it must make them available free of racial distinc-
tions.35 With respect to the operation of state housing facilities, 
the claim that segregation is permissible because use of the ac-
commodations is a privilege and not a right has been unequivo-
cally rejected.36 
PoLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTs IN THE UNITED STATES, 1205 (2d ed. 1958); Note, The New 
Jersey Housing Anti-Bias Law: Applicahility to Non-State Aided Developments, 12 RUT-
GERS L. REv. 557,562 n.31, 565 n.41 (1950). 
Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App.2d 1, 18, 260 P.2d 668, 678 (1953), cert. 
denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954}, raises and rejects the argument that since segregated housing 
may in fact make more housing available to Negroes than would othenvise be the case, 
the interest of the state in housing outweighs the interest of the Negroes in equal access to 
whatever nonsegregated facilities can be operated. The case repudiates Favors v. Randall, 
40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941). 
Analytically, it is improper to consider popular resistance, loss of property values, etc., 
as possible defenses to conduct already asserted to be a denial of equal protection, for this 
is to make the self-contradictory statement that one may properly act unconstitutionally 
under certain circumstances. Rather, the proffered defense is a part of the interest weighed 
initially in determining whether the conduct is constitutional. 
34. "Successfully" is intended in the sense of effectuating its legitimate interest in 
housing. Sec Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13 (1958}, where the Court acknowledged de-
fendant school board's argument that integration had cast a "serious financial burden" on 
the school district and that "the education of the students had suffered and under e:cisting 
conditions will continue to suffer," because of the resistance of the white community; the 
Court held that these considerations would not justify maintaining the schools on a segre-
gated basis. The result was foreshadowed in the second Brown case, 349 U.S. 294, 300 
(1955), where the Court stated: "[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these 
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with 
them," apparendy including manifestations of disagreement such as a drop in total school 
attendance which might result from popular resistance to integration. 
35. "The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply • • • training, or of 
the quality of the training which it docs supply, but of its duty when it provides such 
training to furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality of right." 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938). "Such an opportunity, where 
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180, 1186 (1954). 
36. "Whether or not it be a property right which the housing authority 'creates and 
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The housing policy at many universities falls short of the types 
thus far discussed, however, and drops into the twilight zone of 
constitutionality. These universities may list all registered land~ 
lords and make the whole list available to all students regardless 
of race or color; the housing office may not even know which 
landlords discriminate, or if it does know, it does not use this 
knowledge to withhold any addresses from minority students.37 
The act of discrimination thus is exercised only by the landlord 
when the student applies to him personally. 
If the mere maintenance of a referral office which services land~ 
lords, some of whom discriminate, is conduct of a kind which 
denies equal protection, it must be unconstitutional only because 
it fosters, facilitates, or "substantially" aids private discrimination, 
and not because discrimination is practiced by the state university 
itself. The Supreme Court has never decided whether such a prac~ 
tice does violate the equal protection clause, principally because 
cases of this nature almost uniformly have been brought against 
the real estate owner who has discriminated, rather than against the 
state agency directly or indirectly assisting the owner.88 Discu~ 
sion in these cases with respect to the state encouraging or aiding 
discrimination has not been directed to the issue of permissible 
conduct by the state, but to the issue of "state action" in the conduct 
of the real estate owner.39 It is not at all clear from these cases that 
enforces,' the state is engaged in furnishing suitable housing accommodations. • • • This, 
of course, it must do within the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment." Banks v. 
Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App.2d 1, 16-17, 260 P.2d 668, 677 (1953), cert. denied, 
347 u.s. 974 (1954). 
37. It is, perhaps, arguable that if the university housing office is aware of which land-
lords will not accept Negroes and yet refers a Negro student to such landlords, the office has 
damaged him "by subjecting him both to psychological injury and to an unnecessary con-
sumption of time and energy." Letter From Sol Rabkin, June 23, 1960, in the author's files. 
Rabkin, The Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing, 
6 N.Y.L.F. 38 (1960); Saks & Rabkin, Racial and Religious Discrimination in Housing: 
A Report of Legal Progress, 45 IowA L. REv. 488 (1960). 
38. See discussion in note 27 supra, and see the dissenting opinion in Dorsey v. Stuyve-
sant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 542, 87 N.E.2d 541, 555 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 
(1950), which would have held unconstitutional the conduct of "private" tract developers 
who operated closely with and under the regulation of the government. 
39. The one area where impermissible conduct is the result of inseparable private and 
state action grows out of the restrictive covenant cases, where the privately made decision 
to discriminate is rendered effective only through intervention and enforcement by a state 
court. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); 
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). Looking to the action of the state as represented by 
the state court, there is doubtless "state action" present "when[ ever] state law is applied 
to determine legal relations between private persons." Horowitz, The Misleading Search 
for 'State Action' Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. C.U.. L. REv. 208, 209 
(1957). The same modicum of state action is present, whether the case arises in an effort 
to enforce a covenant, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, to collect damages for its breach, Barrows v. 
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connections between a state and a property owner sufficient to 
identify the owner as a state agent whose conduct is wrongful, 
carry over to render the conduct of the state wrongful.40 
The issue was raised fleetingly in Mitchell v. Boys Club of 
Metropolitan Police/1 where plaintiff sought to enjoin a public 
board of commissioners from contributing any property, facilities, 
personnel or services to a racially segregated private dub. The 
court did not decide the question which concerns us, however, as 
it found that it lacked jurisdiction over the board. More recently 
a California Attorney General's Opinion42 did face the issue 
Jackson, supra, or to clear title of the covenant or to enforce a reverter clause by way of de-
fense. See Robinson v. Mansfield, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 445 (Super. Ct. Ariz.), affd st1b 
nom. Capitol Federal Savings &Loan Ass'n, 136 Colo. 265,316 P.2d 252 (1957); Clifton v. 
Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). It has been suggested that these cases neces-
sarily mark an end to all private discrimination where judicial intervention is required to 
make it effective, as to enforce trespass laws against Negro sit-in demonstrations. This is not 
necessarily so, however, as it neglects a refinement of the other issue in the restrictive cove-
nant cases, viz. what kind of state action was it? Specifically, the conduct in Shelley in-
volved state enforcement of a decision by a former owner to bar Negroes, notwithstanding 
a present willingness of the immediate private owner and the Negro buyer to transact 
business. In balancing the constitutional rights of equal opportunity and nonassociation 
against each other, the latter right may decline in importance when an attempt is made to 
e.xtend it indefinitely in time and to an undetermined number of other persons. Constitu-
tionally, the decision in the Supreme Court meant only that the freedom of nonassociation 
is subordinate to the right of equal opportunity when the right of nonassodation is not 
exerdsed or desired by any immediately partidpating party who has an interest to be vindi-
cated. See McGovney, IWcial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Re-
strictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstittltional, 33 CALIF. L. 
REv. 5, 20-21 (1945). It is, therefore, conduct of a prohibited kind for a state court to 
enforce a privately made decision to discriminate when that decision is cast into a form to 
bind subsequent owners who may not wish to discriminate, and when weighed against the 
right of equal opportunity. 
Under this analysis, the case of Charlotte Park v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 331, 88 S.E.2d 
114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956), was wrongly decided. But Rice v. Siou."' 
City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880, affirming 245 Iowa 145, 60 N.W.2d 110 
(1954), may be proper. Rice involved a refusal by private cemetery owners to bury non-
Caucasians and may be vulnerable to attack on other grounds. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 
U.S. 501 (1946). The refusal of immediate property owners to repulse sit-in demonstrations 
may be vindicated ilirough state courts. See State v. Clyburn, 101 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1958). 
See also Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959); Slack 
v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960). It is submitted 
that the results in these cases are supportable, although the rationale of the court in Slack 
and in Clybt1rn that there was insufficient state action may be in error. Brtt see Valle v. 
Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949); Pollit, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal 
Problems of the First Sixty Days, 1960 DuKE L.J. 315. 
40. That the categories of "state action" and "permissible conduct" continue to be 
confused, see 32 Qps. CAL. ATT'Y GEN., 264, 274 (1959), reprinted in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 
493, 500 (1959), where the Attorney General suggests that the issue of the state rmivero-ity's 
permissible conduct (not the conduct of the fraternities themselves), is partly dependent 
upon the degree of "strict controls" it exercises over fraternities and the "substantial benefits 
and advantages" it confers. Whether or not the university strictly controls but does not 
thereby "aid" landlords in matters such as health and safety inspections, alcohol and moral 
conduct, these connections have no relevance to the permissibility of the university's refer-
ral policy; rather, these elements go only to identifying the fraternities as state agencies so 
that their conduct, which involves a total e.xclusion of Negroes and is thus clearly imper-
missible behavior, can be reached ilirough the fourteenth amendment. 
41. 157 F. Supp.101 (D.D.C.1957). 
42. 34 Qps. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 1 (1959), reprinted in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 1089 (1959). 
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squarely in responding to a legislator's question whether the 
action of state redevelopment agencies in servicing listings of 
discriminatory landlords was conduct prohibited by the fourteenth 
amendment. The Attorney General found that the maintenance 
of such a service was a violation of equal protection because it was 
governmental action which had the practical effect of encouraging 
and fostering discrimination by private persons. In his view, the 
fourteenth amendment does not "countenance active sponsorship" 
by such an agency of racial discrimination by private landlords.43 
The Opinion is open to serious question, however, because the 
principal authorities upon which it relied were the restrictive cov-
enant cases involving the question of the existence of state action.44 
Moreover, in neither of the cases cited was a state agency the de-
fendant. The Attorney General anticipated the enormous impli-
cation of his opinion by observing that the principle that no state 
agency may conduct itself in such a manner as to assist private dis-
crimination was subject to certain exceptions. Thus, he did not 
propose that police and fire protection must be withdrawn from 
property owners who discriminate/5 stating that such assistance 
"only incidentally and passively" benefits private discrimination/6 
A federal court has since held that the furnishing of water and 
sewage services by state agencies to a tract developer who refused 
to sell to Negroes, is not conduct of a kind prohibited by the four-
teenth amendment.47 The case is particularly significant, because 
the state agency itself was joined as defendant. 
That special assistance to property owners who discriminate 
is proscribed by the equal protection clause is, however, supported 
by dicta in Ming v. Horgan,48 a case where a governmental agency 
43. Id. at 3, RACE REI.. L. REP. at 1090-91. On the same page, the Opinion suggests 
that "state action, the practical effect of which is to encourage and foster discrimination by 
private parties, is unconstitutional." 
44. The two principal cases were Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Barrows 
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), discussed in note 39 supra. A third case, Banks v. Hous-
ing Authority, 120 Cal. App.2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954), 
was not in point, since the state agency itself was discriminating. 
45. 34 0Ps. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 1, 2 (1959), reprinted in 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1089, 1090 
(1959). 
46. Ibid. An interesting analogy to this distinction persists in the Supreme Court's 
treatment of permissible conduct by states in rendering "incidental" aid to religion, not-
withstanding the "wall of separation" erected by the first and fourteenth amendments be-
tween church and state. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 168 A.L.R. 1180 
(1947), and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), with Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 2 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1948). 
47. Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960). 
48. 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 693 {Super. Ct. Cal. 1958). 
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was not named as a defendant, but where the permissibility of the 
agency's conduct in extending FHA insurance to a discriminatory 
tract developer was mentioned by the court. In the Ming case, the 
defendant property owner argued that his use of federal insurance 
funds did not bind him to a policy of nondiscrimination because 
Congress had not laid down any such condition in establishing 
FHA. The court rejected the argument and noted the responsi-
bility of the governmental agency itself: 
If it be objected that Congress refused to • • • [require nondiscrimination 
by those benefiting from FHA], it must be replied that Congress could not 
ordain otherwise-the law does not permit it to differentiate between 
races, and whether it expresses that limitation in so many words or not, 
those who operate under that law and seek and gain the advantage it 
confers are as much bound thereby as the administrative agencies of gov-
ernment which have functions to perform in connection therewith.49 
The clear suggestion is that it would be a denial of equal protection 
for the administering agency to assist discriminatory property own-
ers with federal aid. 5° 
In one sense, the line separating permissible from impermissible 
state assistance to property owners who discriminate may appear 
to be illogical in terms of the difference between "necessary" and 
merely "helpful" aid. Thus, state provided services such as police 
and fire protection, or water and sewage supply, are practically in-
dispensable to the property owner and constitute a necessary con-
dition, of his continued discrimination. Yet, other services such 
as state referrals of tenants or state insurance may be only helpful 
to the property owner, and without them he might still operate 
successfully and discriminate at will. Why, then, should state agen-
cies be prohibited from supplying the latter form of aid to dis-
criminatory property owners, but not the former ?51 
49. I d. at 699. [Emphasis added.] 
50. Technically, the issue in Ming drew from the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment rather than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The 
fifth amendment due process clause has, however, been interpreted as proscribing a denial 
of equal protection by the federal government. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954), Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), with Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). See also Heyward 
v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956). 
51. One distinction, occasionally attempted, is to contrast permissible state aid which 
renders a service essential to the welfare of the community, with impermissible aid which 
confers more of a direct benefit to the immediate landowner, a benefit not essential to the 
community at large. The distinction may be helpful in explaining the use of state fire 
protection services even in behalf of discriminatory property holders, on the ground that 
fires would otherwise spread to others, but that is about as far as it goes. Municipal water, 
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Part of the answer may be simply that the wrongfulness of the 
state's conduct is not a matter of causation, but one of the state's 
participation in and intimate relationship to the subject matter of 
the discriminatory scheme itself; the business of supplying water or 
removing sewage is not the business of placing persons in houses 
and does not carry the same responsibility in securing equal treat-
ment for those being placed. And part of the answer must neces-
sarily be a question of policy as to how far the Supreme Court 
wishes to obliterate the distinction between private and state 
action under the fourteenth amendment. If state agencies can be 
enjoined from providing police protection to those who discrimi-
nate, or from providing utilities to landlords who discriminate, or 
from licensing businesses which discriminate, what remains of the 
state-private division in the fourteenth amendment will have van-
ished for all practical purposes. By limiting state responsibility to 
supplying special, or new kinds of services only to those who do 
not abuse those very services through racial discrimination, some 
temporary balance between the constitutional duty of states not to 
foster discrimination and the residual private "right" of nonasso-
ciation may be struck. 
Whatever the situation may be with respect to independent 
state housing offices, it is more likely that the close tie of university 
approved housing to the educational process will mean that regis-
tration and servicing of landlords who discriminate will be held to 
foster discrimination in a manner constituting a denial of equal 
protection. It is safe to assume that many state universities do not 
merely list the landlords and make referrals to them from students 
who accidentally hear that such a list is available; rather, a certain 
amount of free advertising may be provided through campus publi-
cations and through the distribution of placards to registered land-
lords who display them in a window. And certainly where the 
university requires any segment of the student body to live in ap-
proved housing, whether or not the university itself racially screens 
the students, the supplying of such a captive market to the land-
gas, and electrical utilities are of direct, personal benefit to a discriminatory landowner, 
yet withholding them would hardly threaten the nondiscriminatory neighborhood at large. 
Government postal deliveries are hardly critical to the community, and are of direct, per-
sonal benefit to the homeowner, yet it has not been suggested that the fifth amendment 
obliges the Government to withhold postal service from discriminatory homeowners! The 
test of "essential community welfare" would appear to be a phantom, providing no reliable 
standard to predict the type of state assistance the Supreme Court is likely to subject to 
fourteenth amendment equal protection conditions. 
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lords might well be viewed as very substantial assistance. Consid-
ering also that such programs emanate not from an isolated state 
office, the sole function of which is to provide housing referrals, 
but from institutions of higher learning where housing is inti-
mately associated with an educational atmosphere seriously affect-
ing young minds and ideas, it is entirely possible that the Supreme 
Court would hold these programs unconstitutional. 5z 
52. As noted in te.xt at note 22 supra, the Supreme Court has emphasized the obligation 
of state universities to provide a nonsegregated atmosphere for its students beyond the 
classroom itself. In a case involving, among other things, the seating of a Negro student 
at a separate university cafeteria table, the Court employed the following broad language 
in holding that such a practice violated the equal protection clause: "[T)he State, in ad-
ministering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets [the Negro 
student] ••• apart from the other students. The result is that [he] ••• is handicapped 
in his pursuit of effective ••• instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability 
to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, 
to learn his profession." McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). 
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EXPLANATORY NOTES TO APPENDIX, PP. 78-79 
a) -approximately 6o% of undergraduate women live in approved 
off-campus houses; approximately 75% of student men live 
in private houses. 
b)-complaints by offended students are referred to the state anti-
discrimination commission. The housing policy of these 
schools is pursuant to state law and affects only houses with 
more than four lodgers where the premises are otherwise used 
as the lessor's home. 
c) -these universities are now considering the use of written agree-
ments, committing signatory landlords to the university policy 
of nondiscrimination. 
d)-no conditions are imposed with respect to graduate housing. 
e) -letter attached to the questionnaire stated that no discrimina-
tion is allowed within the campus. 
£)-questionnaire was returned with statement that ''Private land-
lords who have proven unsatisfactory for any reason are not 
listed." 
g)-questionnaire has not yet been returned, but correspondence 
received indicates that some policy against off-campus housing 
discrimination is enforced. 
Note: Blank spaces are of undetermined significance, indicating 
in most instances only that no information of a specific kind 
was supplied by the questionnaires which were returned. 
!-Statement of Policy is published in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 803 
(1959)· 
2-Statement of Policy is published in 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 281 
(I96o). 
3-Statement of Policy is published in 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 810 
(1959)· 
APPENDIX 
CoNTROLS ExERCISED BY SELECTED STATE UNIVERSITY HousiNG OFFICES 
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California, Univ. of (Berkeley).......... X X X 1300 X1 X X ~ 
California, Univ. of (Los Angeles)....... X X X 5100 X X X 
Colorado,StateUniv.of(FortCollins) ... X X X X 3500 X(b) X t 
Colorado, Univ. of (Boulder)........... X X X 5000 X2(b) X ~ 
Cornell Univ. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . X X X 4ooo X ~ 
Illinois, Univ. of (Urbana).............. X X(g) ::::! 
Iowa State Univ. (Ames)............... X X X 2500 X X (c) ~ 
Iowa,StateUniv.of(IowaCity)......... X X X x8oo X X (c) 
Michigan State Univ. (East Lansing). . . . . X X X X 2000 X X X ,....., 
Minnesota, Univ. of (Minneapolis)....... X X X X 5500 X X X g: 
New York, State Univ. of (Albany)...... X X X ~ 
Ohio State Univ. (Columbus)........... X X X X 6ooo X X X 1-d 
I» 
Sacramento State College............... X X X X X X 300 X X ~ 
San Jose State College.................. X X X X 67oo X X 8' 
Washington, Univ. of (Seattle).......... X X X 2500 X3 X 
Wayne State Univ. (Detroit)............ X X X 1500 X X 
Wisconsin,Univ.of(Madison).......... X X X (a) X X 
Arizona, Univ. of (Tucson) ............. X X X 
Arkansas, Univ. of (Fayetteville) ........ X X X X t8oo X No X 
Connecticut, Univ. of (Storrs) .........•. ...~ X t::l .... 
"' Delaware, Univ. of (Newark) ........... X X X 75 X 75% No X @ ~ Hawaii, Univ. of (Honolulu) ............ X X 
.... 
Indiana, Univ. of (Bloomington) ........ X X X X 2500 X major- No X .... \0 
ity ~ 
......... 
Kansas, Univ. of (Lawrence) ............ X X X 1000 X No X 
t:l Maine, Univ. of (Orono) ............... X X No ~ 
Massachusetts, Univ. of (Amherst) ....... X X 400 X No ~ Michigan, Univ. of (Ann Arbor) ........ X X X X X f5 Missouri, Univ. of (Columbia) .......... X X X X 2450 X No X ~ Montana State College (Bozeman) ....... X X X 45° :j 
Montana State Univ. (Missoula) ......... X X X X 1500 X No 0 ~ Nebraska, Univ. of (Lincoln) ........... X X X 1300 X No X ~ North Dakota, Univ. of (Grand Forks) ... X X 400 No 
Oklahoma, Univ. of (Norman) .......... (d) X X X 900 (e) ::r: 0 
Oregon, Univ. of (Eugene) ............. X X 1700 X No X <::! ~ Penn. State Univ. (Univ. Park) .......... X X 3100 No !<: 
Pittsburgh, Univ. of (Pittsburgh) ........ X X X 500 c;') 
South Dakota State College (Brookings) .. X X X 2000 X 5% No 
South Dakota, Univ. of (Vermillion) .... X X X No 
Tennessee, Univ. of (Knoxville) ......... (f) X X X 2000 
Utah, Univ. of (Salt Lake City) .......... X X X X No X 
Washington State Univ. (Pullman) ...... X X \ci 
West Virginia Univ. (Morgantown) ..... X X No 
Wyoming, Univ. of (Laramie) .••....... X X 1500 No 
